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THE MORALITY OF LAW
REMARKS ON THE SYMPOSIUM: THE MORALITY
OF LAW
By FRANCIS H. PARKERt
T HE PRIMARY question which has emerged from this symposium
is this: Are the eight canons propounded by Professor Fuller in
Chapter Two of his new book, The Morality of Law, "the internal
morality of law" as he claims; or are they, on the contrary, merely
logical conditions or criteria of law, of something's being a law or a
system of laws, as claimed by Professors Cohen and Dworkin?
The question reminds me of the one which William James said
he once heard being debated by a group of campers: Does a man who
walks around a tree in order to see a treed squirrel, which keeps
hidden by always facing the man from the opposite side of the tree,
actually go around the squirrel?' Each of these two questions can be
properly answered, as James said, only by following the Scholastic
practice of making a distinction. One going round a treed squirrel
circumnavigates the squirrel but never faces its back. The distinction
which must be made in order to answer the question about the internal
morality of law is, in simplest terms, the distinction between the
law and the lawyer.
If the question of the morality of the eight canons concerns
the law, then surely Professors Cohen and Dworkin are correct in
maintaining that the eight canons should be regarded as putative
logical conditions of law, suggested criteria for something's being a law
or a system of laws at all, the logic (rather than the morality) of law
or of the concept of law. Professor Fuller does not seem to deny
this however. He denies only the Cohen-Dworkin thesis that the
eight canons are merely the logic of law and not also the internal
morality of law. Hence everyone seems agreed that in order to have
law at all the eight canons, or something like them, must logically
(not morally) be satisfied. Does anyone then have a moral obligation
to obey the eight canons? The answer is clearly in the affirmative, if,
but only if, that person has a moral obligation to have law at all
(either as its maker or its applier), for the eight canons are putatively
logically equivalent to law itself.
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Now then, is there a moral obligation to have law at all? Yes,
but only in social situations marked by a certain degree of com-
plexity. I do not see that an isolated individual has any obligation
or indeed any need to have laws at all - though his continued existence
and well-being create a conditional need and obligation for at least
those informal rules of conduct which are the precursors of laws.
Neither do small and simply organized groups have any need for or
any moral obligation to have laws. Thus the moral obligation to
have law is not a categorical one; it is only a hypothetical imperative
or obligation conditional upon the obligation to have or the need for
an organized social life possessing a certain degree of size and com-
plexity.
The conditional moral obligation to have law, and thus also
the logical obligation or necessity to conform to the eight canons
which purport to define law logically, is, however, a moral obliga-
tion. not of the law itself, but of the law man - of the man who
makes, applies, or obeys the law. The "internal morality", the moral
obligation to conform to the eight canons, is thus the morality of the
lawyer, not of the law. Indeed, morality in general and moral pro-
nouncements in particular can directly characterize only persons; they
can be applied to things, such as law, only indirectly, that is, to the
extent that those things are regarded as works or acts of persons.
Professor Fuller so applies them by viewing law as purposive activity.
While the eight canons are thus logical conditions of the law, the
compliance with them is the "internal" or logical morality of the person
who makes or applies the law. Such a morality is a specific instance
of the more general morality of being rational or logical. That there
is a morality of being rational, that men do have a moral obligation
to be rational or logical, is clearly confirmed by ordinary conviction
and language2 and it may perhaps also be confirmed metaphysically
as Plato, Aristotle and Kant indicate. Furthermore, it follows from
the conditional morality of having law by satisfying its eight logical
conditions (or something like them) that there is also, as Professor
Fuller points out, a conditional moral obligation to create and enhance
the conditions of lawfulness and its logicality or reasonableness. The
citizens' conditional moral duty to obey the law (at least some laws)
entails, as Fuller rightly says, a correlative moral duty on the part
of legislators and law appliers not to undermine the citizens' moral
duty to obey the law. Again, however, this is a morality of lawyers
rather than of law.
2. E.g., "Look before you leap."
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THE MORALITY OF LAW
What is the relation of this moral obligation of men to satisfy the
eight canons and thus to have laws ("the internal morality of law")
to the "external" or "substantive" morality of the laws thus made
and applied? It is that the former is a necessary but insufficient con-
dition of the latter, as Professor Fuller states and as Professors Cohen
and Dworkin seem to agree. Just as being logical is a necessary but
insufficient condition of completing any determinate action which is
good,8 so also satisfying the eight canons (or something like them)
is a necessary but insufficient condition for legislating and applying
any determinate law which is good. The moral obligation to satisfy
the eight canons (or something like them) demonstrates. that it is
good to have laws (in a society of a certain magnitude and complexity),
but whether these laws which it is conditionally good to have are them-
selves good laws must depend upon other considerations. It is with
these other considerations that the traditional doctrine of natural law
is primarily concerned.
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